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Abstract:  Using a theoretical model of two-candidate competition, I study the political support for a fully 
effective and costless reform targeting high level political corruption.  I find that when the candidates have a high 
discount factor, and when the level of political corruption is not too low, both corrupt and honest candidates have 
incentives to oppose the reform.  I also find that a fully informed and fully coordinated electorate can change a 
candidate's incentives by bundling the reform with high wages and by voting strategically. 
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 1 Introduction
Voters dislike corruption and politicians desire reelection. Yet, in many democracies politi-
cians who are considered as corrupt by many voters win the elections repeatedly. Several
models of political agency study the conditions under which the elected politicians steal,
–for a review, see Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 4). These models also help us understand
which policies should be implemented, that is, which policies would be eﬀective against high
level political corruption when implemented. This paper, instead, studies when an eﬀective
reform may not be implemented due to lack of political support. I show that when the level
of political corruption is high, and when the competing politicians care about their future
rents, both corrupt and honest politicians have the incentives to block a fully eﬀective and
costless reform.
Like any other policy, an anti-corruption reform needs political support. As Rose-
Ackerman (1999, p. 199) notes, “Realistically, reform will not occur unless powerful groups
and individuals inside and outside government support it.” As they do not beneﬁt from
high level political corruption, most of the voters would support an eﬀective reform. This,
in turn, implies that a political candidate can increase his vote share (or the probability
of winning the election) by adopting the reform as part of his policy platform. But, the
existence of widespread and persistent political corruption indicates that candidates are not
simply tools for the median voter.
It is easy to see why a corrupt politician may have incentives to block the reform:
although by supporting the reform he can increase his vote share in the current election,
when the reform is implemented he will lose all of his future illegal rents. Thus, when the
expected value of these rents is high, the increase in his current vote share is not worth the
illegal rents given up.
One may think that since an honest politician has no illegal future rents to lose, he
always adopts the reform. I show that this reasoning is false. For an honest candidate, too,
the reform has a cost. His rival’s corruption provides a positive externality for the honest
candidate. That is, competing against a corrupt rival gives him a (valence) advantage
in elections. Since the reform will turn the corrupt candidate into (practically) an honest
candidate, it will eliminate not only the political corruption, but also the honest candidate’s
1advantage. Thus, when the honest candidate puts a suﬃciently high weight on his future
ego rents, and when his rival is suﬃciently corrupt, the honest candidate, too, has incentives
to block the reform.
To illustrate this point and derive the exact conditions under which all of the competing
politicians have incentives to block the reform, I use a formal model. As Evrenk (2008)
discusses in detail, the model captures the agency problem that occurs when a limited
number of career politicians compete with each other repeatedly. Speciﬁcally, there are two
candidates competing under probabilistic voting; the electorate is represented by a single
voter. I consider two diﬀerent sets of candidates: (i) both candidate are corrupt; and (ii)
only one candidate is corrupt. An advantage of the model is that the equilibrium levels
of tax rate, public good, and corruption are all determined endogenously. In that setup
constitutional constraints that enforce an upper limit on taxes and a lower limit on public
good level would eliminate all the corruption at no cost. Yet, as I discuss in Section 2.1,
the results do not depend on the speciﬁcs of the reform; none of the results would change
had I consider another eﬀective and costless reform, such as fully eﬀective and costless law
enforcement.
To see when politicians will support the reform, I assume that the optimal constitutional
constraints will be added to constitution if at least one of the politicians proposes them.
Thus, at least one politician’s support is needed to eliminate the corruption. The voter,
I assume, is fully informed (she knows which reform would (not) work and will support
only the eﬀective reform). Further, she is fully rational (she is able to calculate her future
beneﬁts from the reform). Despite that, when the level of corruption is high and when the
candidates put a high weight on their future rents, none of the candidates adopting the
reform is a Nash Equilibrium.
In the second Nash equilibrium, both candidates adopt the reform. But, from the
point of view of politicians the second equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the ﬁrst one,
so they have incentives to coordinate on the ﬁrst equilibrium. In Section 3, I examine the
eﬀectiveness of strategic voting in giving incentives to at least one politician to support the
reform. If one politician has incentives to deviate from the ﬁrst equilibrium, then the only
equilibrium of the game is the second one, (Adopt, Adopt). To increase, say, Candidate 1’s
2incentives to support the reform, the voter can commit (credibly) to vote for Candidate 2
when neither candidate supports the reform. Then, Candidate 1 has more to gain from the
reform. Yet, strategic voting is a credible threat only when the reform is the main issue.
When the electorate cares about other aspects of candidates’s platform she cannot carry
her threat. Further, even when she can carry it out, the threat of not being elected in just
one period is not enough to convince Candidate 1 to give up his future rents if the expected
value of these rents is high. Thus, only if the value of these rents are not high, strategic
voting would work.
To be able to identify the politicians’ support for the reform, I assume that no other
obstacles to reform exist. In reality, there are many obstacles: the lack of voter support
due to asymmetric information; high cost of the reform, etc. The main point of the paper is
that even a fully eﬀective and costless anti-corruption reform may not receive the required
support from politicians. In Section 4, I discuss that under alternative and more realistic
assumptions, the corrupt status quo is even more likely to persist.
In the literature, Geddes (1991) studies the politicians’s incentives to initiate an admin-
istrative reform such as replacing patronage in public sector with merit based hiring. She,
too, considers two-party competition and models the support for the reform as a 2x2 game.
The payoﬀs, the incentives and thus the results in her analysis diﬀer from those in this
paper because (i) the politicians’s beneﬁt from patronage is indirect and limited, and (ii)
unlike direct theft, patronage does not produce a positive externality on the other party’s
equilibrium rents. Because of these diﬀerences, she ﬁnds that (i) the party which has less
access to patronage always supports the reform, and (ii) whenever there is relatively large
voter support for the reform,1 the party which has more access to patronage supports the
reform as well.
Caselli and Morelli (2004) provide a general equilibrium model of quality (honesty or
ability) of political candidates. They note that when the legal rents are low, the high quality
candidates will not run in the elections. Further, they note that the low quality (unable or
dishonest) incumbents will keep the legal rents low to keep the high quality candidates out
1That is, when the number of voters who support the reform exceeds the number of voters who can be
bought by distributing favors.
3of politics. They consider a continuum of candidates, i.e., there is no strategic interaction
among the candidates in their model. I show that when there is a limited number of
candidates, (thus, there is strategic interaction among them) even a high quality (honest)
candidate has incentives to block an eﬀective reform.
2 The model
To model the corrupt status quo, I consider the following model. Two career politicians
(candidates) compete with each other in elections that are held at the beginning of every
period, t = 1,2,3,.... In the election at a given t, each candidate j ∈ {1,2} proposes a
tax rate, τjt, and a public good level, gjt. During t, the winner implements the policy he
proposed.
There is a single voter with unit income. Her2 preferences over public and private
good consumption are represented by utility function U(τt,gt) = (1 − τt) + 2γ
√
gt where
γ ∈ (0, 1 √
2). In addition to ﬁscal policies he proposes, each candidate has some ﬁxed
policies (or candidate characteristics) that are orthogonal to (τjt, gjt). The ﬁxed part of a
candidate’s platform may represent his position on issues such as abortion and gun control,
or it may represent the candidate’s characteristics, such as gender, religion, or ethnicity.
The voter’s preferences on these issues are subject to a period speciﬁc preference shock βt.
In each period, βt is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [−1
2, 1
2]. Although the
candidates know that when U(τ1t,g1t) < U(τ2t,g2t) + βt she votes for Candidate 2, (and,
when U(τ1t,g1t) = U(τ2t,g2t) + βt, she tosses a coin), they cannot observe βt when they
formulate their policies. Thus, from their point of view, the voting is probabilistic; the




+ U(τjt,gjt) − U(τkt,gkt). (1)
Each candidate’s goal is to maximize present value of his expected rents. Winning the
2Throughout the paper, the candidates are male, and the voter is female.
3Note that Candidate 1 wins only when U(τ1t,g1t) > U(τ2t,g2t)+βt. The probability that this happens
is equal to F(U(τ1t,g1t) − U(τ2t,g2t)) =
1
2 + U(τ1t,g1t) − U(τ2t,g2t). So, the probability that Candidate 2
wins is given by 1 − F(U(τ1t,g1t) − U(τ2t,g2t)) =
1
2 + U(τ2t,g2t)) − U(τ1t,g1t).
4election provides ego rents, η ∈ (0, 1
2), to all candidates. In addition, if the winner is corrupt
then he pockets the diﬀerence between the total tax revenue and the cost of the public good,
that is, he steals sjt = τjt − gjt. Let us normalize each candidate’s outside option to zero.
Then, j chooses his policy platform, (τjt,gjt), to maximize
X
t
δtρjt(η + θjsjt), (2)
where δ is the (common) discount rate and θj ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether j is honest or
corrupt. Without loss of generality, all possible candidate combinations can be represented
by the following three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive cases:4
(i) HH, both candidates are honest, θ1 = θ2 = 0;
(ii) CC, both candidates are corrupt, θ1 = θ2 = 1;
(iii) HC, Candidate 1 is honest and Candidate 2 is corrupt, θ1 = 0, and θ2 = 1.
Now, let us calculate the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, PSNE, for each case. As a
benchmark, whether the candidates are honest or not, the ﬁrst-best ﬁscal policy (the policy
that maximizes the voter’s welfare) is τ0 = g0 = γ2. Obviously, there is no corruption in
the ﬁrst-best. Note that due to our assumption that γ ∈ (0, 1 √
2), the ﬁrst-best tax rate is
always less than ﬁfty percent.
There are two types of games in the model: the stage game (the competition between
the candidates at a given t) and the supergame, i.e., the stage game repeated inﬁnitely
many times. For the stage game(s), we have the following result.5
Lemma 1 In all cases, there exists a unique PSNE for the stage game. In equilibrium, (i)
each candidate proposes (τ0,g0) in HH; (ii) each candidate proposes (τ0 + 1
2 −η,g0) in CC;




4We need the qualiﬁer, as the other possibility CH with θ1 = 1, and θ2 = 0 is fully symmetrical to HC,
and thus the results for this case are the mirror image of the results for HC.
5To obtain the equilibrium levels of corruption in Lemma 1, note that (due to quasi-linearity) the ﬁrst
order condition with respect to tax rate implies that
∂ρj
∂gj = 1. In CC, the ﬁrst order condition with respect
to public good level is given by (η + sj)
∂ρj







2 − η in CC. In HC, Candidate 1 is honest; he provides the ﬁrst-best policy. Thus,
ρ2 =
1
2 + (1 − γ












5Due to our assumption that η ∈ (0, 1
2), a corrupt candidate always steals in the PSNE
of the stage game, (and, due to our assumption that γ ∈ (0, 1 √
2), we always have an interior
solution). Equilibrium level of corruption is determined through strategic interaction: a
corrupt candidate steals sCC = 1
2 − η in CC but only half of it sHC = 1
4 −
η
2 in HC. Also
note that the lower the (legal) ego rents, the higher is the equilibrium level of political
corruption.
An honest candidate always proposes the ﬁrst best policy: as he receives no utility from
the illegal funds, (2) implies that he maximizes the probability that she votes for him. In
both CC and HH the PSNE is symmetric, thus both candidates win the election with the
same probability, ρ1 = ρ2. In HC, on the other hand, the corrupt candidate, Candidate 2,
proposes a tax rate higher than the cost of the public good where the honest candidate,
Candidate 1, proposes the ﬁrst-best policy platform.6 Thus, Candidate 1 wins more often
in HC, ρ1 = 1
2 + sHC and ρ2 = 1
2 − sHC.
Now, let us consider the PSNE of the supergames in cases HH, CC, and HC. Since
the policy platforms in Lemma 1 are PSNE of the stage games for each case, a strategy
proﬁle in which each candidate proposes these policies in every period is a stationary and
subgame perfect PSNE of the corresponding supergames. For the rest of the paper, I focus
on these PSNE, i.e., I assume that, in CC the winner of the election steals sCC in every
period; in HC, Candidate 2 steals sHC in the periods that he wins; and in HH none of
the candidates steal. As the careful reader notes, in cases CC and HC the supergames
has inﬁnitely many other PSNE, supported, for instance, by trigger strategies, (Friedman,
1971).7 All such PSNE, however, involves even larger equilibrium levels of corruption, and,
as I discuss following Proposition 1, had we considered those PSNE, the main result of this
paper would hold under even a larger set of parameters.
Before calculating the support for a fully eﬀective reform, I need to clarify one of the
assumptions. I assume that a corrupt politician is an honest thief, i.e., he keeps his promises
after winning the election. As Barro (1973) notes, however, a corrupt politician may ﬁnd
6Both candidates proposes ﬁrst-best public good, see footnote 5 for the derivation. This is due to our
assumption that U(τt,gt) is quasi-linear. Quasi-linear utility allows us to obtain closed form solutions, but
it has no qualitative eﬀect on the results.
7The PSNE of the supergame is unique in HH.
6a hit-and-run strategy, (imposing taxes as high as possible, and then stealing as much as
possible), as more proﬁtable. Repeated elections may discourage a hit-and-run strategy.
Because, then, a candidate who failed to deliver what he promised loses his credibility and
thus his future rents.8 The loss of future rents, however, is an eﬀective deterrent only
when a corrupt politician puts a suﬃcient weight on his future rents. More precisely, in
CC, the hit-and-run strategy does worse than keeping the election promises when9 1+η <
η + sCC + δ
1−δ
η+sCC










12 + 8η + (1 + 2η)2. (4)
Below, I focus on the set of parameters (δ and η) under which corrupt candidates keep their
promises. That is, I assume that (3) holds in CC, and that (4) holds in HC.
2.1 Political support for the reform
Although a fully informed voter always supports an eﬀective reform targeting high level
political corruption, the politicians may not. The existence of political corruption implies
that there is an agency problem in politics (the elected politician can get away with behaving
against the wishes of the electorate). Thus, the voter support for the reform is not suﬃcient;
the conditions under which the politicians support the reform need to be examined.
To study the politicians’ incentives to support the reform, note that in the model of
political agency presented above, constitutional constraints enforcing both an upper bound
on the tax rates, T = τ0, and a lower bound on the public good level, G = g0, would
8Corruption does not rule out credibility: in his biography of Mayor Curley, Beatty (2000, p.264) observes,
“[T]he chance to get rich from public oﬃce gave Curley an incentive to deliver on his promises so that he
could be returned to oﬃce to get richer.”
9I assume the worse case scenerio, i.e., when he plays hit-and-run, the corrupt candidate imposes a tax
rate of hundred percent and steals all tax revenue.
7eliminate all political corruption at no cost.10 It is worth noting that what matters for our
analysis is not the speciﬁcs of the reform, but its eﬀectiveness and its cost. So, had we
considered another fully eﬀective and costless reform (such as, severe legal penalties) under
the assumption that legal enforcement is costless, all of the following results would apply.
To be able to see the incentives of the candidates more clearly, I assume that no other
obstacles for the reform exists and the reform is the only issue. For this, consider a refer-
endum for the constitution at the initial (constitutional) period, t = 0.11 Assume that the
constraints T and G can be added to the constitution only if a politician proposes a draft
that includes these constraints. There are no other policy issues: the drafts of the candi-
dates may diﬀer only in whether they include both of these constraints or not. To assume
away other obstacles, assume that the voter is well aware of the beneﬁts of the reform. So,
when a candidate adopts the reform single-handedly, his draft wins certainly. To simplify
the trade oﬀ that a candidate faces, assume that at t = 0 there is no taxation and public
good provision, thus there is no opportunity to steal. That is, the reform threatens only the
illegal future rents.12 If a candidate’s draft becomes constitution, however, he still receives
ego rents, η, at t = 0.13 So, adopting the reform provides (short-term) legal rents for a
politician. Yet, as (2) makes clear a politician maximizes his lifetime (expected) rents.
Below, Game 1 (2) presents the payoﬀs for the candidates at t = 0 for case CC (HC),
–when both candidates are honest, HH, there is no need for the reform. In both payoﬀ
matrices, M stands for δ
1−δ
η
2. Each candidate has to decide simultaneously whether to
adopt the reform or not. If both candidates adopt the reform or if neither candidate does,
then each candidate’s proposal wins with equal probability. Consequently, each receives the
ego rents, η, with equal probability (ρj0 = 1
2 for each j ∈ {1,2}). If only j adopts the reform,
then we have ρj0 = 1. If at least one candidate adopts the reform, then the reform will be
(irreversibly) implemented: at any t > 0 each candidate will have to propose the ﬁrst-best
10The constitutional reforms may be ineﬀective in a more general setup, i.e., when the candidates diﬀer
in their ability. My goal here, however, is not to identify the best possible reform in the most general setup,
but to study if a reform will be supported by politicians when it is fully eﬀective.
11The timing of the reform has no signiﬁcance. As in our analysis time has no end, any period can be the
initial period; one can consider a referandum between any t and t + 1 as well.
12In Section 4, I discuss how the results change, when one removes this assumption.
13Because, for instance, he will be called as a founding father.
8ﬁscal policy, (τ0,g0). So, there will be political corruption, only if neither candidate adopts
the reform. Then, the equilibrium tax rate, public good, and corruption levels at any t > 0
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Game 2: Payoﬀs from adopting the reform when only one candidate is honest.
Now we study the PSNE of each game. The reform will be implemented when it is
adopted by one candidate. Thus, by deviating from (Adopt, Adopt) a candidate only re-
duces his current payoﬀ, his future payoﬀ is unaﬀected; the reform will still be implemented.
So, with one hundred percent voter support behind the reform, if one candidate thinks that
the other candidate will adopt the reform, then he will adopt it as well. More formally,
Lemma 2 In both Games 1 and 2, (i) (Adopt, Adopt) is always a PSNE, and (ii) an
asymmetric strategy proﬁle is never a PSNE.
Now, we check if (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt) can ever be a PSNE. First, consider the
case in which both candidates are corrupt, CC. Given that k does not adopt the reform, j
can adopt it and increase his payoﬀ (at t = 0) from
η
2 to η. But, then the reform will pass,
and j loses all the illegal rents that he would have received in the future had the corrupt
status quo persisted. Thus, given that k does not adopt the reform, j will not adopt it





2 is larger than η + δ
1−δ
η
2, i.e., as long as
δ > 2η. (5)
Second, consider the case in which only one candidate is corrupt, HC. The corrupt
candidate in HC faces a trade-oﬀ similar to the trade-oﬀ that a corrupt candidate faces in
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One may readily think that (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt) cannot be a PSNE in HC, as the
honest candidate does not have any illegal future rents to lose. Formally modelling the










(1 + 2η)2, (7)
the honest candidate, too, is better oﬀ by not deviating from (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt).
The intuition is that the honest candidate, too, has future rents to lose if the reform is
implemented. The reform turns the corrupt candidate into a (practically) honest one;
removing the honest candidate’s (valence) advantage makes him less electable in future
elections. So, when the parameters of the model, δ and η, satisfy both (6), and (7), (Don’t
Adopt, Don’t Adopt) is a PSNE in HC.
Below, I ﬁrst state the main result of the paper, and then discuss it.
Proposition 1 When the candidates’ discount factor, δ, is larger than 2η in CC, and
when it is larger than max{ 2
3−2η,
8η
(1+2η)2} in HC, there exists a PSNE in which none of the
candidates adopts the reform.
Figures 1.a and 1.b depict the sets of parameters under which Proposition 1 holds. In
each ﬁgure, the area above the thick line is the relevant parameter space: the set of the
parameters under which a corrupt candidate keeps his election promises.14 In each ﬁgure
the parameters under which a corrupt candidate does not deviate from (Don’t Adopt, Don’t
Adopt) lie above the dashed curve: in Figure 1.a inequality (5), and in Figure 1.b inequality
(6) holds above the dashed curve. Similarly, the area above the dotted curve in Figure 1.b
depicts the set of parameters under which the honest candidate does not deviate from (Don’t
14That is, the set of parameters under which inequality (3) holds in CC, and inequality (4) holds in HC.
10Adopt, Don’t Adopt), that is, where inequality (7) holds. Thus, in each ﬁgure, the shaded
area depicts the set of the parameters under which (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt) is a PSNE.


















Figure 1: Panel a (b) depicts the set of parameters under which (Don’t Adopt,Don’t Adopt)
is a PSNE in case CC (HC).
We derive the conditions (5), (6), and (7) using the equilibrium levels of corruption
stated in Lemma 1. As we discuss following Lemma 1, the supergame has other equilibria
in which the level of corruption is higher. It is straightforward to show that if one assumes
that the candidates play the other equilibria of the supergame in the status quo, then,
Proposition 1 would hold under even a larger set of parameters. The intuition is that under
such equilibria the corruption levels and thus the future rents would be higher. Then,
deviating from (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt) would be even less attractive.
Proposition 1 heavily depends on the assumption that there are future rents, and that
the candidates care about these future rents. As we discuss above, the assumption that
there are inﬁnitely many future periods allows us to construct a model in which politicians
both steal from the public budget and keep their election promises. Alternatively, one can
assume that each candidate has a ﬁnite life, but the party (or, the family) that he represents
11has an inﬁnite horizon. As Barro (1973 p.28) suggests, if the party can align the incentives
of the candidate,15 then (2) becomes party j’s objective function, and Proposition 1 still
applies.
It is not diﬃcult to argue that a corrupt politicians may have incentives to block the
reform. The second part of Proposition 1, that even an honest politician may have such
incentives, requires more discussion. First of all we do not observe honest (or even dishonest)
politicians openly opposing anti-corruption reforms. Let us note that Proposition 1 is about
the incentives of the candidates, not about their rhetoric. Thus, it should not be interpreted
as when the reform becomes an issue, the politicians will announce that they are against
the reform. I consider a very simple world in which a politician either says yes or no;
real world politicians have more options. When he realizes that the reform will reduce his
future rents, a politician may argue that the reform will not be as eﬀective as expected, or
he may propose a diﬀerent and ineﬀective policy as the truly eﬀective reform (such as only
a constitutional constraint on public good levels).
Second, note that unlike political competition without corruption, political competition
with corruption is not a zero-sum game. Both corrupt and honest politicians beneﬁt from
political corruption, and thus, both have incentives to oppose a reform that will eliminate
these beneﬁts. Further, the honest candidate’s loss due to reform also increase in the level




2, is not too high– his loss from the reform is actually larger than the loss of
the corrupt candidate.16
Still, one may ask if an honest politician makes any personal cost-beneﬁt calculations
when deciding which policies to support. Does an honest politician not always support any
policy that is good for the society no matter how much it costs him personally? It is quite
possible that there exist politicians who ﬁnd it unethical to oppose any welfare increasing
15That is, if it can solve the last-period problem, by oﬀering rewards during his retirement based on how
obedient the candidate was in the oﬃce.
16More precisely, (
1
2 + sHC)η −
η
2 is larger than (
1
2 − sHC)(η + sHC) −
η
2, when η >
1
6. The intuition is
that, although the reform brings both a gain (higher probability of getting elected in future elections) and a
loss (illegal rents) to the corrupt candidate, it brings only a loss to the honest candidate: when the reform is





12policy. Casual observation, however, suggests that sacriﬁcing a large personal gain for the
public good is not common even among politicians who do not steal. Also note that the
honest candidate may be able to justify his opposition to reform to himself by considering
it as an attack to his valence. After all, if the voter wants a clean government, then she can
vote for him; one does not need a reform for this. In HC, the reform is welfare increasing
only because it allows the voter to elect (corrupt) Candidate 2 when βt > 0, that is, when
the honest candidate’s ﬁxed policies, or, even worse, his personal characteristics are less
appealing to voter than these of the corrupt candidate.
To summarize, for most of the parameter space, (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt) is a PSNE
as well. More important, it is a PSNE when the ego rents, η, are small, that is when the
equilibrium level of corruption is high. Although one cannot assert that the politicians will
always play (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt) when there are multiple equilibria, let us note that
they do have incentives to coordinate on (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt): it Pareto dominates
(Adopt, Adopt).17 In any case, the voter would want to make sure that the candidates
do not coordinate on (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt). Since all she can do is to vote, next, I
study if she can achieve this by voting strategically.
3 Political support when the voting is strategic
Assume that at t = 0, the voter knows what type of candidates that he will face in future,
i.e., that he knows both θ1 and θ2. Let us examine if she can make Adopt a dominant
strategy18 for at least one candidate by voting strategically at t = 0.
When neither candidate adopts the reform at t = 0, the voter is indiﬀerent between
them. In Section 2, we assume that in this case she votes for each candidate’s proposal
with equal probability. The voter, however, can credibly threaten candidate j at t = 0
with voting for candidate k if neither candidate adopts the reform.19 Let us calculate the
17For this reason, (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt) would be the unique PSNE had candidates announced
their support for the reform sequentially.
18If Adopt is a dominant strategy for one candidate, then the only PSNE of Games 1 and 2 is (Adopt,
Adopt), cf. Lemma 2.
19Note that strategic voting, (voting for k if j steals more than a certain amount), is not credible in regular
elections at t > 0; then, the voter always votes for the candidate whose policy platform she strictly prefers,
13optimal voting strategy and its eﬀectiveness.
With strategic voting, only the payoﬀs from (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt) change in
Games 1 and 2. It is straightforward to show that, Lemma 2 still applies under the modiﬁed
payoﬀs. Since the game is symmetric in CC, voting strategically for either candidate has
the same level of eﬀectiveness in this case. Thus, without loss of generality, assume that
she votes for Candidate 2 (the column player) when neither candidate adopts the reform.
Then, Adopt is the dominant strategy for Candidate 1 when δ
1−δ
(sCC+η)


























Figure 2: Panel a (b) depicts the set of parameters under which strategic voting eliminates
(Don’t Adopt,Don’t Adopt) in case CC (HC).
Figure 2.a depicts the voter’s gain from strategic voting in CC. It replicates the con-
straints in Figure 1.a, and shows the new constraint, –the upper dashed curve depicts
δ =
4η
1+2η: the area below the upper dashed curve in Figure 2.a is the set of the parame-
i.e., the probability that βt = U(τ1t,g1t) − U(τ2t,g2t) is equal to zero.
14ters under which (8) holds, that is, in this set the only PSNE is (Adopt, Adopt). Thus,
the shaded area represents the voter’s gain, i.e., the set of parameters under which (Don’t
Adopt, Don’t Adopt) is a PSNE when voting is not strategic, but not a PSNE when voting
is strategic.
In HC, if she votes for the corrupt candidate’s proposal when neither candidate adopts
the reform, then Adopt is a dominant strategy for the honest candidate only when δ
1−δ(1
2 +








If she, on the other hand, votes for the honest candidate’s proposal when neither candidate
adopts the reform, then Adopt is a dominant strategy for the corrupt candidate only when
δ
1−δ(1






16η + (1 − 2η)2. (10)
Figure 2.b replicates the constraints in Figure 1.b and it depicts the new constraints, (9) and
(10), for case HC. The shifted dashed curve represents the boundary for (9) and the shifted
dotted curve represents the boundary for (10). In the relevant parameter space, (above the
thick line), when binding, (10) is always weaker than (9). Thus, voting for the corrupt one’s
proposal when neither candidate adopts the reform is a more eﬀective strategy. In Figure
2.b, too, the shaded area depicts the gain from strategic voting.
To summarize,
Proposition 2 By voting strategically at t = 0, the voter can secure the needed political
support for the reform when δ <
4η
1+2η in CC, and when δ < 4
5−2η in HC. Her most eﬀective
voting strategy in HC is to vote for the corrupt candidate when neither candidate adopts the
reform.
Thus, as Figures 2.a and 2.b make clear, in either CC or HC, strategic voting is eﬀective
only over a small subset of the parameter space. Intuitively, the voter can (credibly) threaten
one of the politicians by the loss of ego rents in constitutional period. Yet, if the future
rents are high enough (that is, if the expected level of corruption is high), this threat is not
eﬀective.
154 Discussion and Conclusion
In this section I discuss the assumptions of the model, and conclude. To summarize, the
main result of this paper is that when the level of corruption is high, and the politicians
put a high weight on their future rents, both corrupt and honest politicians have incentives
to block a fully eﬀective anti-corruption reform. If the electorate is fully informed and
fully coordinated, then (only under a small set of parameters) the voter(s) may alter these
incentives by voting strategically.
One may think of several obstacles to the anti-corruption reform. In this paper, I as-
sume that there are no obstacles except the one that I study: opposition by politicians.
To make the conditions as favorable as possible for the reform, I made many simpliﬁca-
tions. For instance, I assume that the reform is the only issue in the referendum. This
assumption implies that, a candidate who adopts the reform single-handedly receives the
ego rents certainly, ρj = 1. Alternatively, and more realistically, one may assume that the
reform is one of the many issues in the general elections, that is, each candidate presents
a multidimensional policy platform where his support for the reform is only one of the di-
mensions, –the other two dimensions is ﬁscal policy τj and gj. In this case, adopting the
reform single-handedly increases j’s probability of winning only by the present discounted
value of the increase in voter’s welfare due to reform, ∆Wt. That is, adopting the reform
does not always guarantee an election victory. To obtain an analytical solution to this
version of the model is diﬃcult. I run numerical simulations, and ﬁnd that then the honest
candidate never deviates from (Don’t Adopt, Don’t Adopt). The intuition is that since he
already proposes a policy platform with lower taxes and thus receives a high vote share
in the corrupt status-quo, the increase in his vote share due to adopting the reform never
compensates for the future rents lost.20
I consider an ideal reform, and ignore all other obstacles to the reform not because I
think that always (or, even sometimes) there are fully eﬀective and costless anti-corruption
reforms lacking only the political support. The point of the paper is that even when there
are no other obstacles, the politicians may still have the ability and the incentives to block
the reform. This result may help explain the persistence of widespread political corruption
20The Mathematica notebooks for these simulations are available from the author upon request.
16in countries where a small group of career politicians compete with each other repeatedly.
And the analysis in this paper, I hope, can be helpful to design a successful anti-corruption
reform in such countries.
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